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ABSTRACT
Asset prices remain depressed for prolonged periods of time following mutual
fund fire sales. We show that this price pressure from fire sales is partly due
to asymmetric information which leads to an adverse selection problem for ar-
bitrageurs. After a flow shock, fund managers choose to sell low-quality stocks.
To measure this, we use short interest as a proxy variable for the unobservable
negative signal managers use when selling. Following flow shocks, managers are
significantly more likely to sell stocks which, ex ante, have high short interest.
Moreover, these stocks experience future price drops that do not later reverse.
In other words, fund managers have stock selling ability. Our findings suggest
an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire
sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle
pure price pressure from negative information.
Keywords: adverse selection, asymmetric information, fire sales, information economics,
institutional investors, slow moving capital.
JEL Classification Numbers: G12, G14
I. Introduction
It is clear that asset prices remain low for prolonged periods of time following mutual
fund fire sales (Coval and Stafford (2007)).1 What is less clear is why these effects persist,
given that mutual fund fire sales are, arguably, common knowledge events. Mutual fund
holdings are publicly released at regular intervals. Moreover, although mutual fund flows
are not instantaneously viewable, a number of papers argue that fire sale price pressure
is predictable (e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007), Shive and Yun (2012), Dyakov and Verbeek
(2013), Arif, Ben-Rephael, and Lee (2014)). Together, these facts beg an important question:
why don’t arbitrageurs correct mispricing from fire sales sooner?
In this paper, we offer an explanation for the long-lasting impact of price pressure from
mutual fund fire sales. Specifically, we show that mutual fund managers do not randomly
sell stocks when they experience a flow shock, but rather, they choose to sell those stocks
which they believe will perform poorly in the future.2 Moreover, we find evidence that fund
managers have some skill at selling stocks: a subset of the stocks they sell experience severe
price drops which do not subsequently rebound. In other words, part of the observed under-
performance of fire sales stocks is due to negative fundamental information. As a result,
our findings suggest an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed
following fire sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle
pure price pressure from negative fundamental information.
To investigate the persistence of price pressure from fire sales, we first examine the trading
motivation of managers following a flow shock. Of course, the information set of fund man-
agers is inherently unobservable, which makes it difficult to know why fund managers choose
to sell a particular stock. Accordingly, we use a well-established predictor of negative future
1A number of other papers document empirical evidence of fire sales in a variety of asset classes. See, for
example, Pulvino (1998), Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011), Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai
(2012), and Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz, and Sherlund (2014)).
2We note that we are not the first to suggest this point. For example, Kisin (2011) and Edmans,
Goldstein, and Wang (2015) both develop identification strategies which control for the possibility that
managers use private information when selling stocks after outflows.
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returns as a proxy variable for negative information about each stock.3 A large literature
has shown that short sellers are skilled at identifying overvalued securities; stocks with high
short interest today earn lower returns in the future (e.g., Senchack Jr. and Starks (1993);
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008)). Short sellers are also skilled at identifying corporate
misconduct (e.g., Karpoff and Lou (2010)), a specific type of negative fundamental informa-
tion. More recently, Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou (2015) find that short interest contains
information about aggregate market returns and several papers provide evidence that short
sellers are skilled at processing information (e.g., Boehmer et al. (2008); Engelberg, Reed,
and Ringgenberg (2012). Hence, given the well-documented properties of short interest, we
adopt short interest as a measure of negative fundamental information.
Using short interest as a proxy variable for negative information, we find strong evidence
that mutual fund managers possess some stock selling ability. Following a flow shock, fund
managers are significantly more likely to sell high short interest stocks. In other words,
fund managers do not simply sell a prorated fraction of each stock in their portfolio, but
rather, they sell more of those stocks which have negative fundamental information.4 Using
a linear probability model we find that a one standard deviation increase in short interest
is associated with a 2% increase in the probability that a manager of a distressed fund will
sell a stock.
Importantly, we note that our results are related to, but distinct from, existing work which
finds that hedge funds and short sellers front-run mutual fund fire sales (e.g., Shive and Yun
(2012), Dyakov and Verbeek (2013), Arif et al. (2014)). Our findings show a positive relation
between short interest in a specific stock and selling behavior by fund managers. Conversely,
front-running suggests that short sellers can anticipate which funds will be distressed. Absent
other private information, however, short sellers should not be able to identify specific stocks
3Wooldridge (2010) discusses the conditions under which a proxy variable is valid. We discuss our proxy
variable in greater detail in Section II.B, below.
4In Section III, below, we note that we cannot distinguish between two competing explanations for this
finding: (i) It is possible that fund managers independently uncover the same negative information being
used by short sellers. (ii) Alternately, it is possible that fund managers merely condition on short interest
when making their trades.
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that managers will choose to sell in greater than expected proportion. In other words, while
the existing literature has documented robust evidence of front-running, our results show
something new: following flow shocks, mutual fund managers choose to sell those stocks
that have negative fundamental information.
We also note that our results are related to the long-standing short interest puzzle which
questions why short interest data continues to predict future returns even though short
interest data is publicly available. In our context, the puzzle takes a slightly different form:
since investors face an adverse selection problem when they see price pressure from fire
sales, why don’t they use short interest to separate assets into low-quality and high-quality?
There are several possible explanations for our findings. One possibility is that investors
face substantial portfolio re-balancing costs such that they do not trade on all information
at their disposal.5 It is also possible that, prior to our findings, investors were unaware of
the signal value of short interest in the context of fire sales. Several paper shows that return
predictability diminishes after the publication of academic studies (e.g., Schwert (2003) and
McLean and Pontiff (2015)). We explore these issues in greater detail in Section III.D of the
paper.
Finally, we show that selective selling by fund managers can partly explain the long-
lasting impact of price pressure from fire sales. In general, it takes nearly two years for
price pressure from fire sales to completely reverse (Coval and Stafford (2007)). However,
for stocks with high short interest, we find that depressed prices persist for much longer.
In Figure 2, the evidence suggests that prices of high short interest stocks remain low for
much longer than two years, while prices for low short interest stocks revert to normal in
approximately one year. Moreover, using a linear probability model, we find that high short
interest stocks are significantly less likely to revert to their pre-fire sales prices. These results
shed new light on return predictability following fire sales. Accordingly, we also examine a
trading strategy that buys fire-sale stocks with low short interest and short sells those with
5This is consistent with Novy-Marx and Velikov (2014) who show that the optimal way to account for
trading costs is to have a higher threshold for changing a position than for maintaining a current position.
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high short interest. For holding periods from month 7 to month 18 after the fire sale event
quarter, the annualized 4-factor alpha of the strategy is 3.6%. When the holding period for
the short leg of the strategy is from month 1 to 6 after the event quarter, the alpha of the
strategy is 9.6% annually.
Our results are related to an extensive theoretical literature on fire sales. Several papers
argue that fire sales occur as a result of limits to arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Gromb and Vayanos (2002)). Our findings are consistent with the limits to arbitrage expla-
nation in that arbitrageurs may be unable to distinguish pure price pressure from private
information which leads to a type of model risk. In that sense, our results are also related
to the large literature on adverse selection in the presence of information asymmetries. We
document evidence of the classic “lemons” problem as described in Akerlof (1970). In our
setting, we argue by revealed preference that fund managers who own a particular stock are
likely to have some information advantage about the value of that asset. In other words,
managers choose to buy an asset because they believe they can value it better than other
market participants. Following a flow shock, managers must sell some of their holdings and
they use their information advantage to optimize this decision. Specifically, they reevaluate
their asset holdings and choose to sell the stocks they believe will perform poorly in the
future, although the magnitude of the flow shock may lead them to sell other (high quality)
stocks at the same time. As a result, following a flow shock, managers will sell a mix of low
and high-quality assets and other market participants may be unable to distinguish between
the two types. This causes all fire sale assets to experience price drops (i.e., they all sell at
the “lemon” price).
Our results are also broadly consistent with the predictions of Dow and Han (2015) who
model fire sales in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. In their model, some investors
are informed and act as arbitrageurs who buy some (but not all) assets following fire sales.
As a result of these informed trades, asset prices are correct and this separates low-quality
assets from high-quality assets thereby allowing other, uninformed, investors to buy the
4
remaining supply of fire sale assets at their fundamental value. However, in cases of market
stress, the informed investors may be unable to buy assets which then prevents uniformed
investors from trading due to the classic lemons problem.6 Thus, all fire sale assets sell at
the lower “lemon” price.
Overall, our paper makes several contributions. First, we provide an explanation for the
long-lasting impact of price pressure from fire sales. We are the first to show that following
a flow shock, fund managers choose to sell stocks with negative fundamental information.
Thus, arbitrageurs face an information asymmetry which makes it difficult for them to
disentangle pure price pressure from negative fundamental information. As a result, price
pressure takes a long time to correct. Second, and more generally, our results suggests
that information asymmetries may help explain the slow moving capital phenomenon as
theorized in Duffie (2010). Arbitrage capital has been shown to be slow to react in a wide
variety of contexts; our results show that information asymmetries can explain the reluctance
of arbitrage capital to correct mispricings. Third, our results provide indirect evidence that
fund managers do have some skill, even though academic studies consistently fail to document
alpha. In that sense, our results provide indirect evidence consistent with the predictions of
Berk and Green (2004).7 In our context, flow shocks leave mutual funds temporarily out of
equilibrium which allows us to document new evidence of stock selling skill by managers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data and discusses
the calculation of key variables. Section III presents the analyses and findings. Section IV
concludes.
6In Dow and Han (2015), fire sales occur because informed investors are constrained in times of crisis
and this generates an adverse selection problem. In our tests, we do not explicitly condition on systematic
shocks. However, our results are consistent with an adverse selection problem.
7Berk and Green (2004) argue that funds exhibit decreasing returns to scale and in equilibrium investors
will allocate more capital to those funds with more skill. As a result, alphas will be driven to zero across all
funds even though some managers have more skill than others.
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II. Data
To test whether price pressure from fire sales is a result of adverse selection caused by
information asymmetries, we combine data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(“CRSP), Compustat, and Thomson Financial, as discussed in detail below.
A. Sample Construction
Our sample consists of all U.S. firms in Compustat over the period 1990 to 2010. We
include all firms that list their common stock on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)
and NASDAQ and we exclude American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”), Exchange Traded
Funds (“ETFs”), and Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”).8 To be included in the
sample, we require non-missing data on monthly short interest, market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio, and institutional ownership.
We obtain monthly short interest data from Compustat. Short interest is the quantity
of open short positions (in shares) with settlements on the last business day on or before
the fifteenth of a calendar month. Each month, U.S. stock exchanges calculate short interest
as of the fifteenth of the month and publicly report the data four business days later.9
We download historical short interest data from Compustat and express short interest as a
fraction of shares outstanding.
In addition to the short interest data, we also obtain firm-level accounting data from Com-
pustat and we match this data to financial market data from CRSP using the CRSP/Compustat
merge file. From Compustat, we calculate the book value of equity. We define book equity
as total shareholder equity minus the book value of preferred stock plus the book value of
deferred taxes and investment tax credit. If total shareholder equity is missing, we calculate
it as the sum of the book value of common and preferred equity. If all of these are miss-
8Specifically, we include only assets with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11.
9Starting in September of 2007, the exchanges began reporting short interest data twice a month (at
the middle and end of the month). For consistency, we keep only the mid-month short interest value, as in
Rapach et al. (2015).
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ing, we calculate shareholder equity as total assets minus total liabilities. From CRSP, we
include the bid-ask spread, shares outstanding, stock price, stock return, and volume. We
calculate market capitalization as the product of the CRSP share price and the number of
shares outstanding.
To measure institutional ownership in each stock, we use data from the Thomson-Reuters
Mutual Fund Holdings database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum). The Thomson-Reuters
Mutual Fund Holdings database provides the quantity of shares held by each fund in a given
quarter. To construct capital flows into and out of mutual funds, we use the CRSP mutual
fund monthly net returns database. The calculation is discussed in detail in Section II.C,
below.
To mitigate the impact of illiquid stocks, in each period we drop stocks with a price
less than $5. To mitigate potential data errors, we also drop observations in a period if
the stock experienced a split or repurchase in that period. Similar to Khan, Kogan, and
Serafeim (2012) the resulting database includes approximately 300,000 observations at the
stock-quarter level over our 20 year sample period.
B. Abnormal Short Interest
We define the short interest ratio (SRi,t) of firm i in month t as the ratio of shares
held short to the number of shares outstanding. The prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Hutton,
Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001); Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005)) documents that firm
characteristics including the book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, and past stock
returns have a significant impact on short interest. Because we are interested in using short
interest as a proxy variable for the unobservable information set of fund managers, we want
to control for the determinants of short interest that are unrelated to negative information.
Accordingly, we calculate a measure of abnormal short interest which isolates the impact of
these firm characteristics.
To do this, we first calculate expected short interest and we then define the abnormal short
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interest ratio (Abnormal SR) as the difference between actual and expected short interest
as in Karpoff and Lou (2010). To calculate expected short interest, at the beginning of each
month we assign each stock to one of 27 portfolios constructed by independently sorting
stocks into terciles based on market capitalization, book-to-market, and the prior one-year
return, all measured at the end of the previous month. We use the portfolio assignment to
define indicator variables which take the value one if a stock is in a particular portfolio and
zero otherwise, and we run panel regressions of the form:
SRi,t = Sizelowi,t + Sizemedi,t +BMlowi,t +BMmedi,t+
PastRetlowi,t + PastRetmedi,t + γk + i,t,
(1)
where the dependent variable is the short interest ratio (SRi,t) of firm i in month t, Sizelowi,t
and Sizemedi,t are indicator variables that equal one if firm i is assigned to the portfolio
of the bottom and middle third of market capitalization, respectively, BMlowi,t, BMmedi,t
are indicator variables that equal one if firm i is assigned to the portfolio of the bottom and
middle third of book-to-market, respectively, PastRetlowi,t and PastRetmedi,t are indicator
variables that equal one if firm i is assigned to the portfolio of the bottom and middle third
of past returns, respectively, and γk represents k industry fixed effects defined using two-digit
SIC codes. We estimate the model and calculate expected short interest (Expected SR) as
the predicted value from equation (1). Finally, we define Abnormal SRi,t = SRi,t−Expected
SRi,t.
We stress that our Abnormal SRi,t represents deviations from the expected value of short
interest for each stock. As such, in our analyses we are not simply screening on stocks which
always have high short interest, but rather, stocks which likely had recent (unexpected)
negative signals. As such, we argue that our Abnormal SRi,t variable is a valid proxy
variable for the true quantity of (latent) negative information about a stock.
Wooldridge (2010) discusses the requirements for a valid proxy variable. Formally, there
are two requirements for a variable, z, to be valid proxy variable for a latent variable q:
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1. E[y | x, q, z] = E[y | x, q]
2. L[q | 1, x1, . . . , xK , z] = L[q | 1, z],
where E[·] is the expectations operator and L[·] is a linear projection operator. The first
condition says that the proxy variable z is not related to y after accounting for q. In
our case, this condition seems uncontroversial and implies that short interest would not be
related to fire sales if we could control for the actual quantity of negative information about
a stock. The second condition is more complicated, and is similar to an exclusion restriction
in a standard instrumental variables model. It requires the correlation between the latent
variable q and each covariate x to be zero after we include the proxy variable z. Of course,
since q is unobservable, this restriction is inherently untestable. However, Wooldridge (2010)
notes that even if z is an imperfect proxy such that the second condition does not hold, it
is likely that the Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) estimator will be better than if no proxy
variable is included. Accordingly, we proceed by defining Abnormal SRi,t as a proxy variable
for unobservable pessimistic information about stock i in month t.
C. Flow-induced mutual fund sales (purchases)
Finally, to quantify the magnitude of fire sales in each stock, we follow Coval and Stafford
(2007) and Khan et al. (2012) to construct fund flow induced trading pressure for each stock
held by mutual funds during our sample period. Specifically, we define flows for fund j in
month s as:
Flowj,s =
[TNAj,s − TNAj,s−1 · (1 +Rj,s)]
TNAj,s−1
, (2)
where TNAj,s is total net assets for fund j as of the end of month s and Rj,s is the monthly
return for fund j in month s. We measure total net assets and returns using the CRSP
mutual fund monthly net returns database. To match our estimated Flowj,s variable with
quarterly fund holding data from Thomson Financial, we sum the monthly flows over the
quarter to obtain quarterly fund flows Flowj,t =
∑s+2
s (Flowj,s) for each fund j in quarter
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t. Then, we calculate flow-induced trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as:
Pressurei,t =
[
∑
j
(max(0,∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t > 90th%)−
∑
j
(max(0,−∆Holdingsj,i,t)|flowj,t < 10th%)]
SharesOutstandingi,t−1
.
(3)
As in Coval and Stafford (2007), stocks in the bottom decile of Pressurei,t are considered
to be experiencing excess selling demand from mutual funds with large capital outflows.
Accordingly, we define price pressure for intensive sell stocks, PrcPres(ISP), as those stocks
with extremely high outflows (below the 10th percentile of price pressure at each date) and
price pressure for intensive buy stocks, PrcPres(IBP), as those stocks with extremely high
inflows (above the 90th percentile of price pressure at each date).
D. Summary statistics
Table I provides summary statistics for the combined database. All variables are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of outliers and detailed def-
initions of these variables, except those defined above (abnormal short interest and fund
flow-induced fire sales and purchases), are provided in the Table A1 of the Appendix.
The mean (median) short interest ratio (SR) over our sample is 2.5% (1.7%), consistent
with the existing literature (e.g., Rapach et al. (2015)). By construction, abnormal short
interest (Abnormal SR) has a mean of zero, but we note that it is highly right skewed with
a 99th percentile of 15.6%. Thus, some stocks experience extremely high abnormal short
interest, indicating that there is likely pessimistic information about their valuation. Finally,
both the mean and median of price pressure for intensive sell stocks (PrcPres(ISP )) are
negative, as expected, indicating funds are selling these stocks in large quantities.
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III. Results
In this section, we examine whether the magnitude and persistence of price pressure
following fire sales can be explained by negative information which leads to selective selling
by fund managers. Our findings suggest that price pressure from fire sales can partially be
explained by selective selling by fund managers which leads to information asymmetries that
make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure from negative information.
We begin by examining the trading motivations of fund managers to determine which
stocks they sell (and why) following fire sales. Next, we examine the performance of fire sale
stocks, conditional on our proxy variable for negative information. Then, we examine the
risk-adjusted returns to a simple-trading strategy to quantify the value of the information
in fire sales. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings.
A. Trading Motivation of Fund Managers
To investigate the persistence of price pressure from fire sales, we first examine the trading
motivation of managers following a flow shock. As previously discussed, the information set
of fund managers is latent, which makes it difficult to know why fund managers choose to
sell a particular stock. Thus, we use short interest, a well-established predictor of negative
futures returns, as a proxy variable for negative private information about each stock. A
number of papers find that short sellers are informed traders who are skilled at identifying
overvalued stocks. As a result, there is robust evidence that high short interest predicts
lower future returns, consistent with short interest being a measure of negative information
(e.g., Senchack Jr. and Starks (1993); Boehmer et al. (2008), Rapach et al. (2015)).
As discussed in Section II.B, we focus our analyses on abnormal short interest to ensure
we are capturing stocks which had recent (unexpected) negative signals and not merely
persistently high short interest. Figure 1 graphs Abnormal SR in event time over a two-year
window around fire sales. Interestingly, Abnormal SR begins rising approximately one year
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prior to the fire sale, and peaks in the months immediately before the event, before falling
sharply in the months following the fire sale. Table II contains the corresponding data for
the mean short interest ratio (SR) and the mean abnormal short interest ratio (abnormal
SR) in event time.
The event time data on abnormal short interest is consistent with a number of expla-
nations. First, it is possible that short sellers are skilled at anticipating which funds are
likely to experience negative flow shocks which will result in forced selling. As a result,
short sellers may front-run stocks that are owned by funds which will soon experience fire
sales. Indeed, several papers document robust evidence of front-running (e.g., Shive and
Yun (2012), Dyakov and Verbeek (2013), Arif et al. (2014)). Second, it is also possible that
negative information jointly leads to high short interest and selling by fund managers. We
note that these two explanations are not mutually exclusive.
To explore the relation between short interest and fire sales, we examine whether man-
agers are more likely to sell stocks which experienced recently high abnormal short interest.
Our null hypothesis is that, absent negative information about the fundamental value of each
stock, fund managers experiencing a fire sale should sell stocks in proportion to their hold-
ings.10 For example, if a manager had 40% of their portfolio allocated to GE, 30% allocated
to 3M, and 30% allocated to Ford and the manager experienced $10 million in redemptions,
then we would expect the manager to sell $4 million of GE, $3 million of 3M, and $3 million
of Ford. On the other hand, if the manager has private information that one of these stocks
is likely to underperform going forward, we would expect the manager to concentrate their
selling in that asset.
To examine this, we explore the determinants of fund manager selling using linear prob-
10More specifically, we theorize that, absent private information, fund managers would sell stocks in
proportion to their holdings after accounting for the relatively illiquidity of each asset. Accordingly, we
control for illiquidity in our analyses.
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ability panel regressions of the form:
1[Sell]i,t = α + β1AbnormalSRi,t−1 + β2Sizei,t−1 + β3B/Mi,t−1+
β4PastReti,t−12:t−2 + β5Bid− Aski,t−1 + i,t,
(4)
where 1[Sell]i,t is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a manager sells stock i in
month t, AbnormalSRi,t−1 is the abnormal short interest ratio in the month prior to the
fire sale, Size is the natural log of market capitalization in the month prior to the fire sale,
B/Mi,t−1 is the book-to-market ratio in the month prior to the fire sale, PastReti,t−12:t−2
is the cumulative return on the stock over the past 11 months, measured from two months
before the fire sale to 12 months before the fire sale, and Bid − Aski,t−1 is the difference
between the closing ask price and the closing bid price scaled by the closing mid-point of
price. Importantly, Bid−Aski,t−1 controls for each stock’s liquidity prior to the fire sale. In
all models we cluster the standard errors by firm and year-quarter.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table III. In all of the specifications we find strong
evidence that fund managers are more likely to sell stocks with abnormally high short interest,
our proxy for negative fundamental information. The coefficient of 0.13 on Abnormal SR
in column (2) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in abnormal short interest
is associated with a 2% increase in the probability of sale by a manager. In other words,
fund managers sell stocks with negative information in greater than expected proportion.
Interestingly, we also find that fund managers are significantly more likely to sell larger
stocks, stocks which decreased in value over the previous 2 to 12 months, and stocks which
are more liquid. In other words, the results suggest that fund managers strategically choose
which stocks to sell.
In Panel B of Table III, we repeat the analysis using OLS panel regressions to examine
the relation between abnormal short interest and abnormal net trading according to the
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model:
AbnormalTradei,t = α + β1AbnormalSRi,t−1 + β2Sizei,t−1 + β3B/Mi,t−1+
β4PastReti,t−12:t−2 + β5Bid− Aski,t−1 + i,t,
(5)
where AbnormalTradei,t is defined as the percentage change in holdings of stock i in month
t by a fund less the expected trading in that stock. We calculate the expected trading in the
stock based on the dollar flow from the fund prorated across its holdings in each stock as of
the beginning of the quarter. In other words, we assume that each fund manager prorates
the flow shock across his/her holdings; the dependent variable in equation (5) measures
deviations from this benchmark case.
Once again, the positive and significant coefficient on Abnormal SR in column (2) sug-
gests that a one standard deviation increase in abnormal short interest is associated with a
1.3% increase in abnormal selling which represents a large increase in selling relative to the
unconditional mean abnormal trade of 16.3%. Thus, fund managers are significantly more
likely to sell stocks which had negative fundamental information. Moreover, in Panel B we
again find that fund managers sell an abnormally large quantity of liquid stocks and stocks
which recently experienced negative returns.
In sum, our evidence suggests that managers selectively choose which stocks to sell fol-
lowing a flow shock. As a result, our results are distinct from existing findings that short
sellers front-run mutual fund fire sales. We find a positive relation between short interest in a
specific stock and selling behavior by fund managers. However, the front-running hypothesis
suggests that short sellers can anticipate which funds will be distressed. But without other
private information, short sellers should not be able to identify specific stocks that managers
will choose to sell in greater than expected proportion. Thus, while the existing literature
has documented significant evidence of front-running, our results document a new fact: fol-
lowing flow shocks, mutual fund managers choose to sell those stocks that have negative
fundamental information.
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B. Information Content of Selling Decisions
In the previous section, we showed that fund managers were significantly more likely to
sell stocks which, ex-ante, had high short interest (our proxy variable for negative funda-
mental information). In this section, we provide further evidence of the information in fire
sales. Specifically, we examine the relation between fire sales and future stock returns. To
examine whether fire sale fund managers possess private information which they use when
selling stocks, we again condition on ex-ante abnormal short interest as a proxy variable for
negative information.
We start with a simple event study of abnormal returns around fire sales. Figure 2 graphs
cumulative abnormal returns in event time over an approximately two-year window around
fire sales. Table IV contains the corresponding monthly return values as well as t-statistics
and the cumulative return values. Similar to the well-known return pattern documented by
Coval and Stafford (2007), we find that returns start to fall in the quarter immediately prior
to the fire sale. More interesting, however, is the pattern that emerges in later months. We
split fire sale stocks into two portfolios: (i) those with ex-ante low abnormal short interest
(Low Abnormal SR) and (2) those with ex-ante high abnormal short interest (High Abnormal
SR). Following a fire sale, the Low Abnormal SR portfolio stocks experience a modest price
drop at t+1 (a negative 90 basis point return), but then the price immediately levels off and
even starts drifting upward. By month 18, the cumulative average return is again positive.
On the other hand, High Abnormal SR stocks experience extreme price drops during the
event month and for the next three months. Moreover, the prices of these stocks remain low;
they do not revert over our sample. While Low Abnormal SR stocks experience a maximum
cumulative loss of 3%, High Abnormal SR stocks experience a maximum cumulative loss of
almost 7%.
The results are generally consistent with models of adverse selection in which fire sales
cause managers to sell a mix of both low-quality and high-quality assets (e.g., Dow and Han
(2015)). Following a flow shock, managers choose to sell the worst stocks in their portfolio;
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these stocks experience subsequent price drops that do not later reverse (i.e., the High SR
stocks). If the flow shock is large enough, fund managers must also sell some high quality
assets; these stocks experience temporary price drops (i.e., the Low SR stocks).
To explore this pattern further we examine multiple multivariate OLS panel regressions
of the form:
CARi,t+h = β1Pressurei,t + β2SRi,t + µi + γt + i,t+h, (6)
where CARi,t+h is the cumulative return from time t-3 to time t + h, Pressurei,t is price
pressure as in Section II, and SRi,t is the short interest ratio at time t. µi is a firm fixed
effect to control for possible unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. Similarly, γt is a
time fixed effect. To examine the relation between fire sales, negative information, and future
returns, we run 24 different regressions where the returns are measured from time h=1 (i.e.,
one month ahead) to h=24 (i., two years ahead).
The results are shown in Table V with t-statistics calculated using standard errors clus-
tered by firm and month shown in italics to the right of the coefficient estimates. At all
horizons, the coefficient on short interest is negative and for h=1 through h=21 the estimate
is statistically significant at the usual levels. Thus, consistent with the existing literature
on short selling, we find strong evidence that high short interest stocks underperform in
the future. More interestingly, however, the coefficient on Price Pressure is never statisti-
cally negative. Thus, after controlling for negative information, we no longer find evidence
that fire sales stocks underperform in future months. Consistent with the visual evidence in
Figure 2, the results suggest that after controlling for negative information, fire sale stocks
experience relatively flat returns for several months before eventually drifting upward.
Overall, the totality of the evidence suggests that when faced with a flow shock, fund
managers strategically choose which stocks to sell and these choices contain valuable infor-
mation about future prices. Moreover, our findings suggest that fund managers will choose
to sell low-quality assets, but because flow shocks can be large in magnitude, they will also
sell some high-quality assets. The resulting mix of low-quality and high-quality asset sales
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leads to an adverse selection problem similar to the classic lemons problem (Akerlof (1970)).
Other investors, who could potentially buy fire sales stocks, must worry that some stocks
were sold purely due to flow shocks while others were sold due to negative fundamental
information. Faced with this adverse selection problem, all fire sale stocks sell for the low
“lemons” price and so prices remain depressed until the true asset type is later revealed.
Consistent with theoretical models (e.g., Dow and Han (2015)), our results thus provide an
explanation for the magnitude and persistence of price pressure following fire sales.
C. The Value of Fire Sale Information
So far, our results suggest that fund managers have stock selling skill. As such, our find-
ings provide an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire
sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price
pressure from negative information. In this section, we explore the value of the information
in fund manager selling decisions around fire sales. To do this, we examine risk-adjusted
portfolio returns to strategies which condition on fire sales and negative fundamental infor-
mation (i.e., abnormally high short interest).
We start by forming two portfolios: the first portfolio consists of fire sale stocks with low
abnormal short ratios (Low SR) while the second consists of fire sale stocks with high abnor-
mal short ratios (High SR). We define low (high) short ratios based on whether the monthly
abnormal SR measure is below (above) the cross-sectional median among all intensive selling
pressure stocks. We then calculate calendar time returns to these portfolios over various hori-
zons, using equal-weighted portfolio returns. Finally, we regress the monthly excess returns
of our portfolios on the Fama and French (1993) three factors and the momentum factor.11
We examine three different holdings horizons. In Panel A, we examine returns to a
portfolio that begins trading 7 months after the event date and holds stocks until month
18. This strategy is motivated by the visual evidence in Figure 2 which shows that fire sales
11The monthly Fama and French (1993) factors are from Kenneth French’s website.
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stock prices begin to rise approximately 7 months after the event month. In Panel B, we
examine returns to a portfolio that begins trading 1 month after the event date and holds
stocks until month 6 (i.e., the complement to the strategy in Panel A). Finally, in Panel C,
we examine returns to a portfolio that combines both strategies and buys stocks beginning
7 months after the event date and holds them until month 18 while shorts stocks starting 1
month after the event and holds them until month 6.
The results are shown in Table VII with t-statistics, calculated using Newey and West
(1987) standard errors, reported next to the coefficient estimates. In all panels, columns (2)
and (3) present results for the Low SR portfolio, columns (4) and (5) present results for the
High SR portfolio, and columns (6) and (7) present results for a long-short strategy that
buys Low SR stocks and shorts High SR stocks.
In Panel A, column (2), the positive and statistically significant intercept of 0.0043 sug-
gests there is a large positive alpha to buying low short interest stocks following a fire sale.
The estimate suggests these stocks earn nearly a 5% annualized four-factor alpha. Moreover,
in column (6), the long-short alpha is again positive and statistically significant, although
slightly smaller than the long-only alpha.
Interestingly, in Panel B, column (2) and (4), we find the mirror image result. The long-
only portfolio earns a statistically insignificant alpha, but the short-only portfolio earns a
large and statistically negative alpha of 40 basis points per month (4.7% annualized). Again,
the long-short alpha is positive and statistically significant (6% annualized).
Finally, in Panel C, we examine the risk-adjusted returns to a strategy which combines
the best of the strategies in Panels A and B. Specifically, we buy stocks beginning 7 months
after the event date and hold them until month 18 while simultaneously shorting stocks
starting 1 month after the event and holding them until month 6. Admittedly, this strategy
benefits from the knowledge already presented. However, such a strategy is feasible given
the information available to an investor at each point in time. The results suggest there are
large alphas possible from trading on fire sale stocks. In column (6), the coefficient of 0.0083
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suggests a statistically and economically significant annualized alpha of nearly 10%.
Overall, the evidence suggests that, following fire sales, managers sell low quality assets.
If the flow shock is large enough, the managers may also sell high quality assets, leading to
a lemons problem for would-be arbitrageurs. However, by using short interest as a proxy
variable for negative fundamental information, it is possible to disentangle the low-quality
assets from the high-quality assets, generating large risk-adjusted returns in the process.
D. Discussion and Interpretation
Our results all point to the same conclusion: fund managers selectively choose which
stocks to sell following a fire sale and this makes it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle
pure price pressure from negative information. However, several outstanding issues remain.
First, any statement about the motivation of sales following flow shocks should explain
both (i) the choice of assets which are sold and (ii) the timing of those sales. Put differently,
if fund managers have negative fundamental information about some of their holdings, why
didn’t they sell these stocks sooner? There are several possible explanations for this. First,
we note that our analyses relied on abnormal short interest, so that our proxy variable for
negative information focused on new (abnormal) information about a stock. As such, the
negative signal largely arrived proximate to the flow shock, which explains both the choice
of assets and the timing of the sale. Second, we also note that fund managers likely face
portfolio re-balancing costs (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary). Novy-Marx and Velikov
(2014) examine optimal trading strategies in the presence of transaction costs. They find
that the optimal trading strategy is biased towards holding a current position. In other
words, even if a manager receives a signal, it may not be optimal for them to act on it. In
our context, this suggests that fund managers may have negative information about some
of their holdings, but choose not to trade on this information right away. Following a flow
shock, managers are forced to sell and thus it becomes optimal to use their information when
making these trades.
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A second issue relates to the long-standing short interest puzzle. A number of papers note
that high short interest predicts lower future returns. Since short interest data is publicly
available, this begs a question: why don’t other investors trade on the signal in short interest
until it is arbitraged away? In our context, the short interest puzzle takes a slightly different
form. Since investors face an adverse selection problem when they see price pressure from
fire sales, why don’t they use short interest to separate assets into low-quality and high-
quality? One possibility is that, prior to our findings, investors were unaware of the signal
value of short interest vis-a-vis fire sales. Several paper shows that return predictability
diminishes after the publication of academic studies (e.g., Schwert (2003) and McLean and
Pontiff (2015)). As a result, it is possible that price pressure from fire sales will diminish
going forward as investors learn to separate low-quality fire sale assets from high-quality fire
sale assets.
In sum, our findings contribute to several literatures. First, we provide an explanation
for the long-lasting impact of price pressure from fire sales. Following a flow shock, fund
managers choose to sell stocks with negative fundamental information and thus arbitrageurs
face an information asymmetry which makes it difficult for them to disentangle pure price
pressure from negative fundamental information. Second, our results suggest that informa-
tion asymmetries may help explain the slow moving capital phenomenon as theorized in
Duffie (2010). Third, our results provide indirect evidence that fund managers do have some
skill, even though academic studies consistently fail to document alpha (e.g., Berk and Green
(2004)).
IV. Conclusion
It is now well documented that asset prices remain low for prolonged periods of time
following mutual fund fire sales (Coval and Stafford (2007)). Yet, the precise reason for
this large and persistent mispricing remains unclear. Mutual fund holdings are publicly
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released and several papers argue that fire sale price pressure is predictable. Thus, why
don’t arbitrageurs correct mispricing from fire sales sooner?
We provide an explanation for the puzzling persistence of price pressure from fire sales:
information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price pressure
from negative information. Following a flow shock, fund managers choose to sell low-quality
stocks. Using short interest as a proxy variable for manager’s unobservable negative signal,
we find that managers are significantly more likely to sell stocks low-quality stocks. Moreover,
these stocks experience future price drops that do not later reverse. In other words, fund
managers have stock selling ability which leads to an adverse selection problem for other
investors. Our findings explain the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following
fire sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure price
pressure from negative information.
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Figure 1. Abnormal Short Interest in Event Time around Fire Sales
The figure plots the abnormal short interest ratio (Abnormal SR), in event time, for fire sale stocks
using data from 1990 through 2010. The event month is denoted by t=0, and the figure displays
the cross-sectional mean of Abnormal SR each month from 12 months prior to the fire sale month
to 12 months after the fire sale. Abnormal SR is calculated as the difference between the raw short
interest ratio (SR) and the expected short interest ratio (expected SR) as discussed in Section II.B of the text.
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Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Event Time around Fire Sales for
High and Low Short Interest Stocks
Each quarter, intensive buy pressure (IBP) stocks and intensive sell pressure (ISP) stocks are grouped into
two event portfolios, IBP portfolio and ISP portfolio. Within each portfolio, stocks are further sorted into
High short ratio (High SR) and Low short ratio (Low SR) portfolios, based on whether the abnormal SR
measure is above (below) the cross-sectional median among all IBP (ISP) stocks. The event quarter is
the portfolio formation quarter, and the event month 0 is the last month of the event quarter. For each
portfolio, the equal-weighted returns for each portfolio from 3 months before event month 0 till 24 months
afterwards. The average mean portfolio abnormal returns in excess of the market returns are calculated,
and the 3-month moving average of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are reported. Panel solid black
line displays results for low short interest stocks, while the dotted-black line displays results for high short
interest stocks.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
The sample includes all NYSE and NASDAQ stocks with non-missing data on monthly short interest,
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past 12-month returns, and institutional ownership (13f) over
the period January 1990 to December 2010. The time-series mean, median and t-statistics of the cross-
sectional average value of the following variables are reported: SR (the ratio of month-end short interest
over beginning-of-month number of shares outstanding), Abnormal SR (estimated in Table A1, model 2),
Size (market capitalization in millions of U.S. dollars), B/M (the ratio of the most recent available book
value over the market capitalization), PastRet (past 2 to 12 month stock returns), Bid-Ask Spread is the
monthly bid-ask spread as a fraction of the closing mid-point, and InstHld (the ratio of institutional holdings
(13f) over the number of shares outstanding. The time-series mean of the cross-sectional standard deviation,
the 1st and the 99th percentile values of these variables are also reported. In addition, the corresponding
summary statistics for price pressure measures of intensive sell stocks (PrcPres(ISP)) are reported. The price
pressure measures are defined in equation (3) and based on Coval and Stafford (2007) and Kahn, Kogan,
and Serafeim (2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable Mean Median t-stat St. Dev. 1st % 99th %
SR 0.026 0.018 25.210 0.042 0.000 0.201
Abnormal SR 0.000 0.000 4.790 0.037 -0.044 0.156
Size 2,715.420 3088,69 33.840 11,871.570 13.410 47,091.110
B/M 0.642 0.622 86.800 0.766 0.043 2.879
PastRet 0.245 0.215 16.130 0.731 -0.598 2.881
Bid-Ask Spread 0.021 0.021 23.210 0.024 0.001 0.113
InstHld 0.478 0.442 40.730 0.276 0.004 0.990
PrcPres(ISP) -0.007 -0.007 -19.310 0.006 -0.032 -0.003
27
Table II
Short Interest in Event Time around Fire Sales
The table displays short interest in event time around fire sales for intensive sell portfolios
(ISP). The event quarter is the portfolio formation quarter, and month t=0 is the last month
of the event quarter. Columns (2) and (3) display the mean and t-statistic for Raw SR which
is short interest as a fraction of shares outstanding while columns (4) and (5) display the
mean and t-statistic for Abnormal SR which is calculated as the difference between Raw SR
and the Expected SR as calculated in equation (1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event Raw SR Abnormal SR
Month Mean t-value Mean t-value
t-14 3.44 12.57 0.16 1.63
t-13 3.46 12.91 0.16 1.68
t-12 3.43 13.24 0.15 1.66
t-11 3.45 13.19 0.11 1.25
t-10 3.54 13.03 0.19 1.90
t-9 3.56 12.75 0.19 1.90
t-8 3.63 12.49 0.21 1.98
t-7 3.66 12.34 0.23 2.34
t-6 3.66 12.50 0.23 2.41
t-5 3.69 12.45 0.25 2.43
t-4 3.76 12.53 0.27 2.50
t-3 3.73 12.69 0.24 2.47
t-2 3.77 12.88 0.28 2.85
t-1 3.76 13.05 0.27 2.86
t=0 3.71 13.05 0.23 2.53
t+1 3.70 13.09 0.23 2.57
t+2 3.68 13.07 0.18 2.01
t+3 3.67 13.15 0.15 1.72
t+4 3.68 13.31 0.17 1.94
t+5 3.67 13.40 0.14 1.56
t+6 3.68 13.49 0.17 1.91
t+7 3.65 13.36 0.16 1.73
t+8 3.64 13.36 0.13 1.42
t+9 3.68 13.48 0.15 1.50
t+10 3.65 13.52 0.14 1.40
t+11 3.68 13.22 0.15 1.46
t+12 3.66 13.27 0.12 1.25
t+13 3.64 13.16 0.12 1.27
t+14 3.64 13.14 0.08 0.94
t+15 3.67 13.19 0.10 1.16
t+16 3.65 12.97 0.09 1.03
t+17 3.66 12.93 0.06 0.67
t+18 3.66 12.97 0.05 0.64
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Table III
Relation between Short Interest and Selling by Fund Managers
This table reports the panel regression results on the relation between the sell decision of
distressed funds on a stock and the previous quarter’s abnormal short ratio. The average
abnormal short ratio is defined as the average of the monthly abnormal short ratio dur-
ing the previous quarter. The control variables include LN(Mktcap) (the log of market
capitalization) , B/M (the ratio of the most recent available book value over the market
capitalization), Avgret (past 2-12 month stock returns). In Panel A, the dependent variable
is a sell dummy: Sell=1 if during the current quarter the net trading of a stock is negative
by all distressed funds hat hold the stock at the beginning of the quarter, and 0 otherwise.
Distressed funds are those funds in our sample that experience the top 10% outflow during
the same quarter. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the negative of the abnormal net
trading of a stock during the quarter by all distressed funds that hold the stock at the be-
ginning of the quarter. The abnormal trading of a stock is defined as the percentage change
in holdings by distressed funds, net of the expected trading on the stock. For each stock
and each distressed fund that hold the stock at the beginning of the quarter, we calculate
the expected number of shares to be sold by the fund based on the dollar flow from the fund
proportional to its percentage holdings of the stock at the beginning of the quarter. The
expected sales of the stock is then defined as the sum of the expected number of shares to
be sold by all these distressed funds, divided by the total number of shares held by the dis-
tressed funds at the beginning of the quarter. In all models the standard errors are clustered
by stock and year-quarter. The sample spans from January 1990 to December 2010.
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Sell Indicator Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Estimate S.E. t-stat
Intercept 0.6880 0.0345 19.92
Avg SR 0.1379 0.0384 3.59
LN(Mktcap) 0.0135 0.0042 3.19
B/M 0.0053 0.0059 0.91
PastRet -0.0162 0.0041 -3.91
Bid-Ask Spread -2.0726 0.6094 -3.40
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Abnormal Net Trading
Variable Estimate S.E. t-stat
Intercept 0.2018 0.0227 8.90
Avg SR 0.3444 0.0363 9.49
LN(Mktcap) -0.0040 0.0028 -1.40
B/M 0.0057 0.0042 1.36
PastRet -0.0307 0.0048 -6.33
Bid-Ask Spread -1.0102 0.2928 -3.45
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Table IV
Abnormal Returns in Event Time around Fire
Sales for High and Low Short Interest Stocks
Each quarter, all ISP stocks in our sample are further sorted into Low Abnormal Short
Ratio (Low SR) and High Abnormal Short Ratio (High SR) portfolios, based on whether
the abnormal SR measure is below (above) the cross-sectional median among all ISP stocks.
The event quarter is the portfolio formation quarter, and the event month 0 is the last month
of the event quarter. For each portfolio, the equal-weighted returns for each portfolio from
3 months before event month 0 until 18 months afterwards. The average mean portfolio
abnormal returns in excess of the market returns are reported, as well as the corresponding
t-statistics, and the 3-month moving average of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) . The
sample spans from January 1990 to December 2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Event Low SR High SR
Time Return t-stat CAR Return t-stat CAR
t-3 -0.25 -0.61 -0.25 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
t-2 -2.02 -4.75 -2.27 -2.06 -4.42 -2.07
t-1 -0.22 -0.51 -1.67 -0.87 -1.91 -1.67
t=0 0.81 2.07 -2.15 -0.56 -1.39 -2.83
t+1 -0.90 -2.10 -2.25 -1.45 -2.83 -3.79
t+2 0.32 0.75 -2.18 -0.84 -1.80 -4.74
t+3 0.08 0.23 -2.34 -0.50 -1.14 -5.67
t+4 -1.08 -2.31 -2.57 -0.99 -2.08 -6.44
t+5 0.26 0.70 -2.82 0.40 0.82 -6.81
t+6 0.67 1.74 -2.87 0.66 1.44 -6.79
t+7 -0.38 -0.82 -2.68 -0.58 -1.05 -6.63
t+8 0.41 1.04 -2.45 0.09 0.22 -6.57
t+9 0.43 1.18 -2.29 0.02 0.04 -6.73
t+10 0.48 0.92 -1.85 -0.08 -0.16 -6.72
t+11 0.03 0.06 -1.54 1.17 2.48 -6.35
t+12 0.44 1.24 -1.22 0.20 0.53 -5.92
t+13 -0.34 -0.85 -1.18 -0.40 -0.77 -5.59
t+14 0.59 1.48 -0.95 0.27 0.63 -5.57
t+15 0.66 1.68 -0.65 0.39 0.85 -5.48
t+16 -0.16 -0.33 -0.29 -0.40 -0.86 -5.40
t+17 0.08 0.19 -0.10 0.27 0.52 -5.31
t+18 0.83 2.11 0.15 -0.08 -0.20 -5.38
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Table V
Relation between Fire Sales, Short Interest, and Future Returns
We estimate panel regressions of the form:
CARi,t+h = β1Pressurei,t + β2SRi,t + µi + γt + i,t+h,
where CARi,t+h is the cumulative return from time t-3 to time t+h, Pressurei,t is price
pressure as in Section II, SRi,t is the short interest ratio at time t, µi is a firm fixed effect,
and γt is a time fixed effect. t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by firm
and month are shown in italics to the right of the coefficient estimates *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Event Time Price Pressure t-stat SR t-stat N R2
t+1 -0.6644 (-1.29) -0.0004*** (-3.10) 12,052 0.330
t+2 -0.6458 (-1.11) -0.0004*** (-3.14) 11,968 0.339
t+3 -0.3046 (-0.47) -0.0005*** (-3.90) 11,893 0.354
t+4 0.0820 (0.14) -0.0005*** (-3.95) 11,829 0.365
t+5 -0.0630 (-0.10) -0.0007*** (-4.66) 11,742 0.382
t+6 0.4184 (0.60) -0.0007*** (-4.29) 11,695 0.389
t+7 0.8860 (1.30) -0.0007*** (-3.79) 11,614 0.390
t+8 0.7338 (0.99) -0.0007*** (-3.56) 11,556 0.397
t+9 0.8139 (1.12) -0.0008*** (-3.56) 11,501 0.402
t+10 0.8936 (1.25) -0.0008*** (-3.72) 11,440 0.405
t+11 1.5256** (2.16) -0.0008*** (-3.59) 11,380 0.410
t+12 1.3472* (1.76) -0.0008*** (-3.67) 11,302 0.411
t+13 1.4298* (1.78) -0.0008*** (-3.53) 11,236 0.416
t+14 1.6243* (1.95) -0.0010*** (-3.75) 11,181 0.422
t+15 1.7613** (2.15) -0.0009*** (-3.48) 11,126 0.422
t+16 1.7439* (1.93) -0.0007** (-2.51) 11,064 0.426
t+17 1.6233* (1.78) -0.0007** (-2.54) 10,983 0.435
t+18 1.6299* (1.69) -0.0006** (-2.52) 10,928 0.440
t+19 2.3654** (2.34) -0.0005** (-1.98) 10,874 0.444
t+20 2.2899** (2.14) -0.0005* (-1.76) 10,798 0.453
t+21 2.3130** (2.25) -0.0005* (-1.73) 10,743 0.457
t+22 2.4697** (2.29) -0.0004 (-1.33) 10,688 0.463
t+23 2.7902** (2.47) -0.0004 (-1.49) 10,643 0.464
t+24 2.8920*** (2.75) -0.0003 (-1.18) 10,597 0.471
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Table VI
Relation between Short Interest and the
Duration of Price Pressure Following Fire Sales
The table reports regression results examining the effect of a stock’s abnormal short interest
as of the quarter-end immediately prior to the stock fire sale quarter on the likelihood that
the stock’s market-adjusted return reverts back to zero during the 18 months following the
fire sales and the length of time (number of months) that the reversion takes. The length of
time varies between 1 and 18 if the abnormal returns revert to zero within the 18 months,
and is set to be 19 if the reversion does not occur during the time period. In Column
(2), we estimate a logit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator variable
that equals one if the stock’s market-adjusted return reverts to zero during the 18 months
and zero otherwise. In Column (3), we estimate a poison regression where the dependent
variable is the number of months between the fire sale event date and the first date on which
the cumulative return becomes non-zero (i.e., the correction date). Year fixed effects are
included in both regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by year are reported below
the estimates in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Correction Number of Months
Variables Indicator to Correction
SR -3.534*** 1.431***
(0.008) (0.004)
LN(Mktcap) 0.056 -0.024
(0.415) (0.346)
AvgRet 0.240*** -0.206***
(0.006) (0.000)
B/M 0.099 -0.039
(0.495) (0.526)
Bid-Ask Spread 15.993*** -6.429***
(0.007) (0.001)
Intercept 0.382 2.331***
(0.395) (0.000)
N 3,194 3,194
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Table VII
Four-Factor Alphas from Portfolios formed on Short Interest around Fire Sales
The table examines four-factor alphas from portfolios formed by conditioning on short inter-
est during the quarter before fire sales. The Low Abnormal Short Ratio (Low SR) and High
Abnormal Short Ratio (High SR) portfolios are based on whether the monthly abnormal SR
measure is below (above) the cross-sectional median among all ISP stocks. We regress the
monthly excess returns of Low SR and High SR portfolios as well as the return difference
(Low SR - High SR) on the Fama and French (1993) three factors and the momentum factor.
t-statistics calculated using Newey and West (1987) standard errors are reported next to the
coefficient estimates. In Panel A, we examine returns to a portfolio that begins trading 7
months after the event date and holds stocks until month 18. In Panel B, we examine returns
to a portfolio that begins trading 1 month after the event date and holds stocks until month
6. In Panel C, we examine returns to a portfolio that combines both strategies and buys
stocks beginning 7 months after the event date and holds them until month 18 while shorts
stocks starting 1 month after the event and holds them until month 6.
Panel A: Holding period: month 7 - month 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Explanatory Low SR High SR Low SR - High SR
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.0043 2.74 0.0013 0.74 0.0030 2.18
Mkt 0.9680 23.32 1.0645 19.48 -0.0965 -2.9
SMB 0.5363 5.28 0.5603 4.93 -0.0240 -0.53
HML 0.4740 6.37 0.4853 5.48 -0.0113 -0.23
Momentum -0.1045 -2.32 -0.1597 -3.16 0.0552 1.18
Panel B: Holding period: month 1 - month 6
Explanatory Low SR High SR Low SR - High SR
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.0011 0.65 -0.0040 -1.98 0.0051 2.59
Mkt 1.0256 26.17 1.1366 19.43 -0.1110 -2.29
SMB 0.4357 3.71 0.6759 5.23 -0.2402 -5.12
HML 0.4516 4.76 0.5267 5.09 -0.0750 -1.2
Momentum -0.0189 -0.53 -0.1998 -4.21 0.1809 2.89
Panel C: Mixed Holding period (Low SR (month 7 to 18) - High SR (month 1 - 6))
Explanatory Low SR High SR Low SR - High SR
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.0043 2.74 -0.0040 -1.98 0.0083 4.01
Mkt 0.9680 23.32 1.1366 19.43 -0.1686 -3.4
SMB 0.5363 5.28 0.6759 5.23 -0.1396 -2.3
HML 0.4740 6.37 0.5267 5.09 -0.0527 -0.78
Momentum -0.1045 -2.32 -0.1998 -4.21 0.0953 1.39
33
V. Appendix
In this section, we provide supplemental analyses to the main text.
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Table A1
Variable Definitions
The table defines key variables used in the paper. The sample properties and databases are discussed in detail in Section II of
the text.
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Source Description
SR Compustat The ratio of month-end short interest over number of shares outstanding
Abnormal SR Constructed The difference between the raw short interest ratio and the expected short interest ratio
Size CRSP Market Capitalization (in $Millions) calculated as LN(price × shares outstanding)
B/M Compustat The ratio of the most recent available book value over the market capitalization
PastRet CRSP Cumlative stock returns from the past 2 to 12 months
Bid-Ask Spread CRSP The closing ask price less the closing bid price scaled by the mid-point of the closing price
InstHld Thomson 13F The ratio of institutional holdings from 13f filings to the number of shares outstanding from CRSP
PrcPres(ISP) Thomson 13F Stocks with extremely high outflows (below the 10th percentile of price pressure at each date)
PrcPres(IBP) Thomson 13F Stocks with extremely high inflows (above the 90th percentile of price pressure at each date)35
Table A2
Estimation of Abnormal Short Interest
Each month, a firm is assigned into one of the 3x3x3 portfolios independently sorted on the market capitalization (Size), book-
to-market ratio (BM), and past 2-12 month return (PastRet), measured at the end of the previous month. SR is then regressed
on Size, BM, PastRet, and industry fixed effects according to the model:
SRi,t = Sizelowi,t + Sizemedi,t +BMlowi,t +BMmedi,t+
PastRetlowi,t + PastRetmedi,t + γj + i,t,
where Sizelowi,t and Sizemedi,t are indicator variables that equal one if firm i is assigned to the portfolio of the bottom
and middle third of market capitalization, respectively, BMlowi,t, BMmedi,t are indicator variables that equal one if firm i
is assigned to the portfolio of the bottom and middle third of book-to-market, respectively, PastRetlowi,t and PastRetmedi,t
are indicator variables that equal one if firm i is assigned to the portfolio of the bottom and middle third of past returns,
respectively, and γj represents j industry fixed effects defined using two-digit SIC codes. The regressions are for the all US
common equity stocks with available SR and information on the explanatory variable, excluding the ”event” stocks. In panel
A, ”event” stocks are defined as the IBP stocks defined in Table 1. In Panel B, ”event” stocks are ISP stocks defined in Table
1. We report the time-series average of the coefficient estimates and the t-statistics are shown below in italics.
Variable Sizelow Sizemed BMlow BMmed PastRetlow Pastretmed InstHldlow InstHldmed
Model 1 Mean -3.07 -0.42 0.39 -0.34 0.68 -0.14
t-Value -29.69 -6.68 21.27 -18.25 17.98 -8.00
Model 2 Mean -1.97 0.05 0.53 -0.28 0.67 -0.17 -1.59 -1.28
t-Value -32.94 0.70 32.95 -16.85 18.75 -9.08 -18.48 -17.52
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